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WHOLE, FREE AND INTEGRATED? 
A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE  
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD 
FABRIZIO TASSINARI* 
For America these countries comprise an immensely important relationship.  
For Europe, it is rather different. These are our next-door neighbours.  
Chris Patten (2005) 
Introduction 
To speak of Egypt, Syria or Russia as part of an emerging ‘European neighbourhood’ will 
probably make some readers across the Atlantic raise their eyebrows. Europe’s political mass, 
they will argue, is so amorphous and convoluted within its own borders that it is hard to imagine 
how the European Union (EU) can exert any meaningful influence on such countries. Yet, the 
emergence of this neighbourhood is not a hopelessly Eurocentric thought. As former EU 
Commissioner Chris Patten implies in the epigraph, physical proximity has made it an 
unavoidable reality.  
This study sets out to reflect on this reality by presenting a transatlantic perspective on the 
security and integration challenges facing the enlarged Europe and its emerging neighbourhood. 
The relevance of this perspective is rooted in recent history. Since the end of the cold war until 
2004, Europe and America’s strategic outlooks towards the (then) European neighbourhood ran 
largely in parallel. The two sides did disagree on several occasions, most blatantly on the 
Western Balkans, but their mainstream discourses on the wider Europe were complementary. 
Washington’s foreign policy mantra was that of a Europe ‘whole and free’,
1 where the dividing 
lines inherited from the cold war were to dissolve through the gradual inclusion of Central 
Europe in the Euro-Atlantic family of nations. The EU focused on its enlargement strategy, 
which ensured that progress of the former Communist countries would be monitored and 
benchmarked, in order to attain the ultimate goal of their full integration into the EU.  
Is this transatlantic goal of making Europe ‘whole, free and integrated’ still valid in the post-
enlargement European context, and is it applicable to the wider European neighbourhood? After 
September 11
th, with a particularly assertive US administration and an increasingly introspective 
EU, the answer to these questions is hardly apparent.  
In an attempt to clarify matters, this article will first offer a conceptual reading of the US and 
EU approaches to the European neighbourhood. It will then map transatlantic divergence and 
convergence in the countries and regions of the European neighbourhood. On the basis of this 
assessment, the third section ponders a set of recommendations to inspire a transatlantic agenda 
that accounts for the emergence of this wider European neighbourhood. 
                                                      
* Fabrizio Tassinari, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, 
an Associate Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and an Adjunct Scholar at the 
Southeast Europe Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. 
The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which he is 
affiliated.  
1 This phrase has been used by senior members of US administrations since the end of the cold war. The 
strongest statement arguably remains that of President George H. Bush in his remarks to the citizens of 
Mainz (West Germany) in May 1989 (Bush, 1989).  2 | FABRIZIO TASSINARI 
 
1.  A Tale of Two Europes 
There is one, somewhat striking, trait that characterises the growing literature on transatlantic 
relations in recent years: polarisation.  
On the one hand, some American scholars have embraced a typically Hobbesian worldview in 
which life is inherently “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. In such a gloomy context, 
America is not only the enlightened carrier of the values of modernity and the country 
manifestly destined to lead the world by example. It is also the only pragmatic, responsive and 
effective superpower capable of manoeuvring in an anarchical world ravished by war, 
intolerance and terror (Kagan, 2003). The EU is credited with having created a ‘post-historical’ 
oasis of prosperity, peace and stability. But it is also regarded as a declining club that deludes 
itself in its ambition to ‘Europeanise’ the world, while it remains divided – and thereby utterly 
irrelevant – on all major issues of foreign policy. 
The view of some Europeans on transatlantic relations appears to be similarly assertive. Jurgen 
Habermas and the late Jacques Derrida (Habermas & Derrida, 2005), two giants of Europe’s 
post-war critical thought, have depicted Washington as an uncompromising, arrogant actor. 
America is regarded as the one international power that – especially since the Iraq war – has 
betrayed the very normative bases upon which it was founded. Washington has acted out of 
self-interest and in contempt of the international institutions created after the Second World 
War. They thus interpret Europe as the emerging global power that is better prepared to face the 
global challenges of the post-cold war era, and thus set to act as a counterweight to the US 
towards a more just, solidaristic and tolerant balance (see also Baumann, 2004).  
Another strand of intellectuals (see Dahrendorf & Garton Ash, 2003) questions the underlying 
assumptions of this dialectic. They regard this gap between America and Europe as excessively 
politicised. For one, it is well known that perceptions within the EU and the US respectively are 
not as monolithic as the arguments above would suggest. In fact, some views within the EU 
(e.g. the newer member states) tend to be closer to what will be here presented as the ‘American 
perspective.’ And the political debate within the US can be just as diverse. To quote British 
historian Timothy Garton Ash, “Bill Clinton spoke like a European – which is precisely what 
the Republican right hated about him” (Garton Ash, 2004, p. 111).  
More importantly, this other group of scholars argues, the ‘West’ is deep down much more 
united than recent occurrences might suggest. What unites it are the basic tenets of liberal 
democracy. These constitute the deepest, and until now most durable, bonds of any 
transnational community in history. In this respect, that already in the 1950s the North-Atlantic 
area could be envisaged (Deutsch, 1957) as a ‘security community’ is not the mere result of 
token Wilsonian idealism. It is the illustration of the deep societal, cultural, moral, economic 
and political sense of community traceable in (then Western) Europe and America. In the post-
cold war period, this solidity of the transatlantic bond has provided convincing evidence in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where what Garton Ash calls the other, ‘European-style’ 9/11 took 
place: the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 (Garton Ash, 2004). Since then, the West 
has been present to offer these countries political and diplomatic support, economic aid and 
technical expertise. The West represented the undivided force that accompanied the transition of 
these countries from the Soviet yoke to economic and political freedom. Their EU and NATO 
membership has reified, in this part of the world at least, Francis Fukuyama’s argument about 
the ‘end of history’: “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation 
of Western liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 4).  
The fact that the 2004 EU and NATO enlargements, the rise of violent fundamentalism and the 
Iraq war are taken as references to explain where the transatlantic partnership is heading is not 
accidental. It is revealing of a particular conceptual niche that the countries and regions lying in A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD | 3 
 
the European neighbourhood have in the transatlantic partnership. In this respect, the above-
sketched interpretations may result in an overall polarised picture. Nevertheless, they offer some 
relevant insights with regards to the American and European perspectives on the wider Europe, 
which is a topic that deserves a closer look.   
1.1  An American perspective on the European neighbourhood   
Over the past six decades, the US has been Europe’s paramount external sponsor. The need for 
Europe’s post-war recovery inspired the Marshall Plan. The Franco-German reconciliation 
guided America’s support for the Coal and Steel Community and for the European Economic 
Community. Washington has relentlessly encouraged the deepening and the widening of 
European integration. 
At the same time, the US has traditionally tended to underestimate the geo-political implications 
of European integration (see Kupchan, 2002, p. 132). The story of the US vision for Europe has 
been one where integration is primarily seen as a grand economic project, which has provided 
tools to achieve peace and stability on the continent. On the other side of the Atlantic, NATO is 
entrusted with the task of ensuring security in Europe. The EU is a highly sophisticated and 
particularly successful functional experiment of regional economic integration, which has 
benefited the US inasmuch as it has benefited its trusted European partners. That the gradual 
deepening of EU integration could lead to the emergence of a united European political actor is 
regarded as the result of a slightly unintended, if welcome, spill-over effect. 
The US foreign-policy establishment, in this sense, does recognise the ‘soft’ power of 
Europeanisation in the absorptive – almost inertial – sense of the word. It has acknowledged the 
EU’s capacity to permeate and thereby transform the domestic systems of its member and 
candidate countries. Yet, the US has implicitly discarded the perception of the EU as an actor 
and as a polity in the making. It has downplayed the ‘harder’, strategic implications of the 
widening and deepening of EU integration for the power constellation in Europe.  
As Washington fails to identify the EU as an emerging polity, it logically follows that America 
also has reservations about looking at Brussels’ neighbourhood initiatives as a form of genuine 
foreign policy. In the 1990s, this aspect was admittedly less evident. The US strongly supported 
the EU’s Eastern enlargement because of its ideological and moral value (i.e. the ‘Europe-
whole-and-free’ argument) and because of the enlargement’s objective effectiveness to embed 
candidate countries in a system of strict rules that made them more stable and prosperous. In the 
post-2004 European neighbourhood, America’s (mis)perception of the EU actorness has begun 
to have more visible repercussions. Simplifying mightily, it has produced what could be defined 
as a Westphalian understanding of the wider Europe.  
This proceeds principally from America’s interpretation of the question of sovereignty. The US 
maintains an intrinsically modernist approach to sovereignty, insofar as it regards the nation as 
the ultimate depository of political power. Both the EU enlargement strategy and, to a lesser 
extent, the various forms of EU engagement with its neighbours are characterised by the 
ambition to fundamentally transform this traditional understanding of sovereignty. The adoption 
and implementation of EU rules and norms are a gradual process that requires a conscious 
devolution of some of the powers and prerogatives that are traditionally attributed to the nation 
state. The European neighbourhood, in this sense, represents a magnifying lens of America’s 
perception of Europe precisely because this pooling and sharing of sovereignty is inherently at 
odds with America’s approach to sovereignty and, thereby, to power.  4 | FABRIZIO TASSINARI 
 
Figure 1. An American perspective on the wider European neighbourhood  
 
 
 
 
 
This Westphalian way of perceiving Europe generates a dialectic, binary map of the wider 
European neighbourhood (Figure 1). If indeed the EU is geared to contribute to Europe’s 
stability, peace and prosperity, then widening is primarily regarded as the tool to further these 
goals. That the EU’s internal cohesion, decision-making mechanisms and ultimately its 
governance system might suffer as a result of continuing enlargement is regarded as an 
unavoidable side-effect. The enlargement strategy itself, and thus the EU actorness, might be 
gradually weakened, but this should not bog down the imperative of extending freedom, 
security and prosperity in Europe.  
In the new neighbourhood context, this means that the priorities of Euro-Atlantic integration are 
gradually being decoupled from the pursuit of security in the continent’s periphery. Washington 
unequivocally supports membership in the EU and NATO where this is deemed to have a 
realistic prospect of engaging and transforming the countries concerned – e.g. the Western 
Balkans, Turkey and even Ukraine or Georgia. Where the EU (or NATO) membership prospect 
is not in sight, Washington may maintain a degree of multilateral engagement, but the bulk of 
its policies – e.g. in the South Mediterranean, Middle East or Russia – are defined bilaterally or, 
in some cases, unilaterally. Put another way, where the prospect of further enlargement is in the 
cards, the US regards Euro-Atlantic integration as an effective instrument to further its strategic 
goals in the region. In the absence of such a perspective, America tends to downplay the 
security potentials of Euro-Atlantic integration and, as we will see, addresses its priorities in the 
region in other ways. 
1.2   An EU perspective on the European neighbourhood   
The EU is now a bloc of 27 countries and almost half a billion citizens: the world’s largest 
common market. It stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from the Arctic to the 
Mediterranean. These new borders bring to Europe’s doorstep a broad array of challenges and 
threats: from Islamic fundamentalism to energy security; from migration to organised crime. 
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Notwithstanding the idiosyncrasies of the EU’s governance system and foreign-policy making, 
these basic facts make it logical and unavoidable that the Union seeks to provide itself with a 
more coherent approach towards its neighbourhood.   
The metaphor of the neo-medieval empire has become familiar as an interpretation of how the 
EU has gone about addressing this challenge. According to this representation, the European 
power constellation is characterised by a hierarchical system with a single power centre, whose 
influence progressively decreases the more the system approaches its periphery, in a concentric-
circled sort of fashion (Wæver, 1996).  
The inextricable correlation between security concerns and the integration process has been 
pivotal for converting the EU into this neo-medieval model. One of the principal objectives of 
the EU has historically been to make security in Europe increasingly less of a concern and to 
pursue integration in order to achieve this goal. This was the rationale behind the economic 
integration initiatives since the 1950s and behind the enlargement process, particularly the latest 
one towards Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement is regarded as the EU’s most powerful 
foreign policy tool to date precisely on the ground that it has succeeded in defusing real or 
potential security concerns through the gradual absorption of European norms, values and 
institutions in the domestic realms of the candidate countries.  
In the post-2004 European neighbourhood, however, the security-integration nexus becomes 
fuzzier and inevitably contested. For one, while producing a process whereby multiple political 
loyalties are allowed to coexist, this neo-medieval model does not necessarily imply a 
diminution of the role of nation-states within the EU. The interests and identities of member 
countries remain factors of the utmost importance in defining the nature, limits, prerogatives 
and finality of the European polity. This inherently ‘Westphalian’ factor assumes a particular 
importance when delimiting the final conceptual and geographical scope of the neo-medieval 
constellation, as the current debate on future EU enlargements demonstrates.    
Figure 2. The EU map of the wider European neighbourhood 
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Further to the concentric-circled logic, moreover, the ability of the EU to ‘desecuritise’ by 
means of its integration process diminishes the farther one stands from the power centre. This is 
apparent if one maps the different policies that the EU has devised for its neighbourhood 
(Figure 2).   
The enlargement process of course remains the most comprehensive and ‘least’ neo-medieval 
among EU instruments towards the neighbourhood. As we will discuss below, however, the 
possible ‘safeguard clauses’ and other restrictions on full membership that are embedded in the 
current negotiations, particularly towards Turkey, point at a more ‘gradated’ application of the 
enlargement strategy.  
Next comes the group of countries currently covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP): the Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, the South Caucasian 
Republics and the western-most former Soviet states. Here the concentric-circled logic is 
primarily embodied by the exclusion of the EU membership perspective. The ENP sets to 
establish the closest possible tie between the EU and these neighbouring countries by 
encouraging overarching political and economic reforms in exchange for a gradual and partial 
integration into the EU. Apart from that, the gradated logic is also intrinsic to the political, 
economic and cultural differences among the countries concerned. The resulting ties between 
the EU and the ENP countries can thus range from some kind of enhanced partnership – e.g. 
with the Southern Mediterranean partners – to deeper economic integration – e.g. with countries 
such as Ukraine or Moldova.   
Russia represents the last ‘ring’ of this structure. The very idea of developing a ‘strategic 
partnership’ between the EU and Russia suggests that the centripetal influence that Brussels can 
exert on Moscow is more limited than in the previous cases. Russia is a larger country, and 
according to some (ibid.), a European ‘empire’ of its own. This notwithstanding, the prospect of 
Russia’s ‘Europeanisation’ and of the partial approximation of its legislative and regulatory 
system remains a goal for some policy-makers both in Brussels and in Moscow. The current 
difficulties that the parties face in attaining this goal, however, confirm the argument that the 
concentration of power in this neo-medieval constellation is inversely proportional to the 
conceptual and geographical distance from Brussels.   
2.  Transatlantic Convergence and Divergence in the European 
Neighbourhood  
To substantiate this general argument about America’s ‘Westphalian’ posture and the EU’s 
‘neo-medieval’ understanding of the wider Europe, this study now proceeds to schematise the 
two sides’ respective approaches to several regions and countries of the European 
neighbourhood.  
Figure 3. Spectrum of transatlantic convergence and divergence in the neighbourhood 
                   
 
 
 
 
While this representation (schematised in Figure 3) does not pretend to be an exhaustive 
portrayal of Washington and Brussels’ multifaceted policies in the various cases, it does aim to 
interpret the sources of transatlantic converge and divergence in the region.  
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2.1  The Western Balkans  
American and European policies on the Western Balkans are here regarded as convergent. The 
rationale behind this convergence goes back to the shameful bloodshed of the 1990s. On that 
occasion, the transatlantic community displayed profound disagreements, mixed with a dose of 
acquiescence, as to how to deal with the parties involved in the Yugoslav civil war.  
At the time, the United States did little to hide its perception of being disproportionately 
involved in the Western Balkans. Surely, there were important instances that made that claim 
justified. It was Washington that first got its NATO partners to threaten air-strikes in Bosnia in 
the early 1990s; Washington put the diplomatic weight behind the 1995 Dayton accords; US 
aircraft were deployed in the 1999 NATO operation against Serbia (see Daalder, 2001). Yet, in 
Washington, there was the thinly concealed perception that the US did not ‘have a dog’ in the 
Balkan fight, as then Secretary of State James Baker put it. The spiral of violence involving the 
former Yugoslavia barely touched US national interests, and at times, politicians found it 
difficult to justify the country’s involvement to the American public.     
These perceptions are largely misplaced. For one, the wars that devastated the Balkans harmed 
US foreign policy inasmuch as they showed that America’s – and Western – core political 
values could be openly and repeatedly vituperated. In an historical phase in which the world was 
adjusting to the post-cold war ‘unipolar’ balance, such state of affairs – in the heart of Europe – 
represented a blow to America’s credibility and legitimacy in the world. Secondly, America’s 
‘disproportionate’ involvement in the Balkans was also overstated. In fact, it was always 
Europe, EU member states and subsequently the EU that carried the vast majority of the burden 
in the region, both in economic and military terms (ibid.). This notwithstanding, Washington 
provided the one thing that Europe failed to produce: political leadership. America did not carry 
most of the load in economic and military terms but it did in political terms. Here is where 
America’s calls for a bolder European involvement were perhaps warranted.  
1999 was a watershed year in this respect. The NATO bombings put an end to Milosevic’s 
reiterated attempts to ‘cleanse’ ethnic diversity from the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo was placed 
under a UN administration. The US and the EU joined forces in the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe, the regional mechanism coordinating the efforts of the international actors in 
the region.  
Since then, Europeans have progressively taken the lead in politically and diplomatically 
steering the future of the region. First, and most importantly, there is the ‘European perspective’ 
of the region. This perspective materialised for Slovenia in 2004, with its accession to the EU. 
Croatia and, possibly, the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia are next in line. But the 
important fact here is the commitment to bring the whole region in the EU, a long process that 
started with the negotiations of the Stability and Associations Agreements and will be 
concluded only by full EU membership of the Western Balkan states.  
Second, there is the part concerning military assistance. In December 2004, EUFOR took over 
from the NATO mission to secure and police Bosnia. As noted, European countries were 
already carrying the majority of the military burden before the EU stepped in. Nevertheless, this 
shift represents an important step, not least at a symbolic level, concerning the political 
commitment mustered at the EU level for the region. Thirdly, there is the gradual 
transformation of the Stability Pact from a largely top-down initiative agreed by the 
international community into a regional initiative that is locally owned by the countries of the 
region, a shift that also finds the EU and the US aligned.  
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Unarguably, there still remain major uncertainties facing the transatlantic community in the 
region: from frailty and viability of state institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the resurgence 
of nationalism in Serbia, to the final status of Kosovo. But the US and the EU have displayed 
coordination and convergence on them, most practically in the ‘Contact Group’ context. 
Perhaps more notably, the respective strategies of the US and the EU appear now to be 
consistent as to where the burden of political leadership between the two should lie. Surely, the 
role of the US in the region will remain fundamental to accompany the transition. The path to 
political and economic reforms in Serbia, and more crucially, Bosnia should continue to rely on 
America’s pressures and involvement. Moreover, as former US envoy to the region James C. 
O’Brien recently noted: “Kosovo’s Albanians will look to Washington for guidance” (O’Brien, 
2006, p. 84), if and when the status question will be settled. The US can also encourage the 
inclusion of the Western Balkans into NATO, which is indeed one of the messages that came 
out of the last Summit of the Alliance in Riga.
2 But it is clear that the EU is tasked with 
providing the overall strategic guidance for the future of the region. The imperative is to 
correlate progress in the reconstruction, domestic transformation and intra-regional trust with 
the gradual inclusion of the countries in the EU: what the International Commission on the 
Balkans calls “member-state building” (International Commission on the Balkans, 2005, p. 29). 
Washington and Brussels’ views on this part of the European neighbourhood are thus 
convergent not only as a result of the tragic spiral of violence of the 1990s. They are convergent 
also because in the Western Balkans there is a reasonably clear commitment on the part of the 
EU to replicate the well-rehearsed, rigorous conditionality machine that characterised the 
enlargement process towards Central Europe. The United States acknowledges its credibility 
and regards it as an effective tool to further its own goals in the region.  
2.2 Turkey 
The transatlantic position on Turkey is regarded as convergent as far as the ultimate strategic 
goals are concerned but increasingly divergent as to the means to be employed to achieve them.  
The US is an adamant supporter of Turkish EU membership, which Ankara began negotiating in 
October 2005. At a time when the modernisation and democratisation in the Arab-Muslim 
world appears to be so blatantly trumped by escalating religious violence, Turkey’s integration 
in the EU is a litmus test to demonstrate how a secular but predominantly Muslim country can 
embrace western-style liberal democracy. Several EU member states share this vision and 
support Turkey’s accession. Some other member states are visibly irritated at Washington’s 
public display of support in what is deemed as an inappropriate and unwelcome interference in 
EU internal affairs.   
Notwithstanding this rather forthcoming approach, and Ankara’s firm place in the Atlantic 
alliance through its longstanding NATO membership, US-Turkey relations have had their share 
of troubles in recent years. In 2003, the Turkish Parliament rejected a resolution that would have 
allowed the transit of US troops on their way to open a second, northern front, in Iraq. This was 
due not only to the perceived risks coming from an area – predominantly Kurdish – that remains 
highly volatile for Turkey’s own security. Ankara’s refusal was arguably also a demonstrative 
act against Washington’s unilateral choice on Iraq. Moreover, Turkey is a staunch defender of 
the 1936 Montreux Convention, which gives Ankara rights to control passages of war vessels 
                                                      
2 It was decided there that Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would have 
a NATO membership prospect for 2008. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, on the other 
hand, have been invited to participate in the Partnership for Peace programme.      A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD | 9 
 
through the Dardanelles straits. This privilege is now particularly problematic, especially in 
view of Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to NATO in April 2004.
3 
As far as the EU is concerned, relations with Turkey have also been animated by the goal of 
furthering Turkey’s modernisation and democratisation through deeper integration in the Union. 
But the way in which this goal should be attained has become an increasingly contested affair in 
recent times. As Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn warned, Turkey’s accession negotiations 
might be heading for a ‘train wreck’. This prediction partly materialised in December 2006, 
when the European Council decided to freeze talks on eight out of the 35 ‘chapters’ of 
legislation that form the basis for EU-Turkey negotiations. The reasons for this decision, in this 
specific instance, concerned Turkey’s reluctance to recognise Cyprus and to open its ports to it. 
But both the EU and Turkey well know that the malfunctions that could eventually cause a 
crash of the enlargement train are much more profound. They relate to Turkey’s size, population 
and wealth distribution; to Europe’s growing uneasiness with multiculturalism. Perhaps more 
importantly, the controversies and ambiguities surrounding the present negotiations relate to the 
fundamental questions about the conceptual and spatial limits of Europe that Turkey’s possible 
EU membership raises.  
The stipulations of the EU-Turkey negotiating framework reflect these concerns and contain 
unprecedented possible restrictions on Turkey’s full membership. They indicate that, in the case 
of the Turkish accession, “negotiations are an open-ended process” and that “long transitional 
periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses” may have to be 
considered (EU-Turkey Negotiating Framework, 2005, p. 6). These provisions effectively mean 
that Turkey might – temporarily or permanently – never be fully integrated into the EU in fields 
such as free movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture.  
This widening transatlantic divergence on the means to be employed to engage Turkey is 
revealing of a more profound disagreement over the implications that deeper relations between 
the EU and its neighbours have on the EU as a polity and as a governance system. Washington’s 
position on Turkey is a good example of its ‘Westphalian’ understanding of the evolution of the 
European integration process. The EU enlargement process has proven to be the most effective 
strategy to address security problems in Europe. The overall strategic importance of Turkey 
makes the case for its full inclusion in the EU self-evident, notwithstanding the possible 
implications that this might have for the functioning and cohesion within the EU.  
On the EU side, the Turkish case is emblematic of the joys and perils of the above-mentioned 
‘neo-medieval’ model. In principle, the EU’s diversified and inclusive mode of governance is 
well placed to address the cultural, economic and political challenges posed by the Turkish 
issue. On the other hand, at a time of deep introspection like the present one, the very fuzziness 
of this model makes policy-makers and the public wary about the ability of the EU to sustain 
Turkey’s accession. 
2.3  The Western CIS countries  
The US and EU policies on Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Republics of the Southern 
Caucasus are largely convergent. The two sides, however, increasingly disagree on the place 
that these countries are to occupy in the Euro-Atlantic institutional setting.  
Since the end of the cold war, the US has supported the transition of former Soviet republics. 
During the Clinton period, for example, Ukraine used to be the third-largest recipient of US aid. 
                                                      
3 Interviews conducted by the author at NATO headquarters, Brussels, May 2006.  10 | FABRIZIO TASSINARI 
 
This support slightly declined after 9/11, also because Vladimir Putin’s Russia was considered 
an indispensable ally in America’s war on terror (see Kuzio, 2006). The ‘coloured revolutions’ 
in Georgia and Ukraine of 2003-05 symbolically marked a change of tack. These coincided, on 
the one hand, with Washington’s disillusionment vis-à-vis an increasingly autocratic Russia. 
Most importantly, these revolutions were regarded as a victory of freedom and democracy, 
which made a perfect match with the foreign policy doctrine of the Bush administration.  
The US has also displayed a pro-active approach with the other countries of the region. The US 
has had an “almost exemplary” (Popescu, 2005, p. 35) coordination with the EU on the ‘frozen 
conflict’ in Transniestria. Most notably, the 2003 unilateral Russian proposal to solve that 
dispute – known as the ‘Kozak memorandum’ – was averted thanks to joint EU and US pressure 
on the Moldovan leadership. The current Bush administration famously listed Belarus among 
the world’s ‘outposts of tyranny’, and in 2004 Congress passed unanimously a Belarus 
Democracy Act to support democracy and human rights. Lastly, the US has been engaged in the 
security situation in the Southern Caucasus, for instance through the so-called Group of Friends 
assisting the UN Secretary General on the Abkhazian conflict; through the OSCE Minsk Group 
on Nagorno-Karabakh, and, less directly, by sponsoring regional mechanisms like the GUAM, 
grouping Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.     
The EU, for its part, has had a rather standardised approach towards these countries. In the 
1990s, it signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with all of them. It set up the 
TACIS programme to support their economic and political transition. The ENP was originally 
designed specifically for some countries in this region.
4 Although its role in the field of conflict 
resolution remains negligible, the EU has also tried to step up its diplomatic role in the region. 
Evidence of this is provided by the appointment of EU Special Representatives for Moldova and 
the Caucasus and by the launching of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Moldova.  
At the same time, the EU remains uncertain as to the overall strategic guidelines of its policy 
towards these countries. While some of these countries, most notably Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia, have repeatedly requested recognition of their European aspirations and perspective, 
the EU prefers to stick to the rather ambivalent approach of the ENP. Part of the reason behind 
this state of affairs is the increased heterogeneity of foreign policy positions within the EU 
member states. More fundamentally, the current state of relations between the EU and the 
western-most former Soviet countries represents a textbook case-study for the detractors of the 
neo-medieval model. The pursuit of gradual and diversified EU integration is, in principle, a 
sensible approach to engage with countries whose reformist credentials remain shaky. Yet, the 
present state of uncertainty looming over the EU and its institutions makes policies like the ENP 
less credible and worryingly insufficient to spur the comprehensive transformation that 
characterised the enlargement process.  
This point is also at the core of the widening transatlantic divergence over the place that these 
countries will occupy in the Euro-Atlantic institutional setting. In recent times, NATO, and the 
US therein, has proven more forthcoming in offering some of these countries closer institutional 
ties, possibly leading to membership. The paradox is that for these countries such a pro-active 
approach risks being counterproductive. Most of the countries in this region have major 
territorial and military disputes to be resolved before a NATO membership path can be 
realistically initiated. The historical background of the region raises sensitive questions too. For 
example, the rumour that a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) could be offered to Ukraine 
at the Riga Summit, sparked loud public protests in the southern part of the country.  
                                                      
4 All this does not apply to Belarus, where the EU froze bilateral relations, has applied sanctions against 
the Lukashenko regime and provides limited support to Belarusian civil society through the ENP.  A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD | 11 
 
In contrast, the EU is set to continue with its ‘half-open, half-closed’ door policy for the 
foreseeable future. A substantial deepening of the bilateral relations with some of the countries 
in the region will be part of the deal. This is for example what is happening in the case of 
Ukraine, with which the EU is in the process of negotiating a new ‘Enhanced Agreement’ that 
will include the prospect of a ‘deep’ free trade area. But as the EU continues its soul-searching 
process of internal reorganisation, a ‘European perspective’ is unlikely to be in sight for any of 
these countries.  
2.4 Russia   
Although the US and the EU have not adopted fundamentally different policies on Russia, the 
two sides diverge in their assessments of Moscow’s place and role in the wider European 
neighbourhood.  
Winston Churchill’s dictum about being ‘magnanimous in victory’ fittingly describes 
Washington’s Russia policy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. America’s main concern 
was to stabilise Russia’s transition and to control its huge and unsafe military capabilities. In 
order to avert instability, the US has painstakingly sought to keep Russia engaged on the global 
scene, despite Moscow’s limited economic weight and uncertain foreign policy direction.  
This basic approach was laid out during the erratic presidency of Boris Yeltsin. In the 2000s, 
under Vladimir Putin, Russia has become wealthier, thanks to its oil and gas revenues. It has 
also become more assertive abroad, especially towards the former Soviet countries. And it has 
reverted to a semi-authoritarian state, curbing civic liberties and media freedom. Senior 
members of the current US administration have sporadically condemned this involution,
5 while 
foreign policy circles have displayed growing uneasiness and dissatisfaction. These sentiments 
notwithstanding, strategic considerations have continued to define the main traits of 
Washington’s Russia policy. In some cases, as in relation to Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
programme, the desire to keep Russia engaged is justified by Moscow’s potential contribution 
to the resolution of the disputes. In other cases, this is more controversial, as for example in the 
case of Moscow’s fully-fledged membership in the G8.  
Overall, it is apparent that the scope of the US-Russian bilateral relationship has considerably 
expanded in recent years, including issues such as energy security, the rise of China and the 
fight against terrorism, for which Russia is regarded as a trusted ally in view of its decade-long 
civil war in Chechnya. In the wider European context, the NATO-Russia Council also deserves 
to be mentioned. This effectively grants Russia a seat around the table with the members of the 
Alliance, in order to tackle matters of common interest from the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destructions (WMD) to counter-terrorism. 
The EU’s approach towards Russia shares with the US the heritage of the cold war containment 
policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The metamorphosis of Europe’s power constellation in the 
1990s, epitomised by the enlargement process, was therefore always counterbalanced by a 
‘Russia first’ policy aiming at enhancing political, economic and societal engagement with 
Moscow.  
In recent years, this approach has been consolidated by a somewhat unexpected diplomatic 
convergence on the international stage and by ever-deeper economic interdependence. 
Concerning the former, some European countries and Russia found themselves on the same side 
in opposing the choices of the US in the greater Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Arguably, 
                                                      
5 See, for instance, the speech of US Vice-President Richard Cheney in Vilnius (Cheney, 2006). 12 | FABRIZIO TASSINARI 
 
Europe and Russia’s reasons for opposing the war were not identical. But Russia does share 
with some EU member states, most notably France, a multipolar view of world affairs, in which 
regional powers like Russia and the EU should play a more active and influential role in 
offsetting US global supremacy. More importantly, the EU and Russia are mutually dependent, 
as the EU is Russia’s first economic partner and increasingly reliant on its energy resources.  
This interdependence has made a closer institutional cooperation between the two sides all the 
more necessary, as underlined by the creation of the so-called ‘four Common Spaces’ on 
economic issues, internal and external security and cultural affairs. This initiative, as well as the 
forthcoming ‘Strategic Partnership’ agreement between the two sides, underlines a desire on the 
part of the EU to deepen Russia’s alignment with the EU’s governance system and, more 
importantly, its adherence to its fundamental norms and values. This also represents the sticking 
point within the EU as to how to further relations with its large neighbour. Large EU member 
states that depend on Russia’s gas imports (mainly Italy, France and Germany) are often 
excessively deferential towards Moscow. Newer EU member states, particularly the former 
communist countries in Central Europe and the Baltic states, have naturally been less 
compromising vis-à-vis their former ruler.  
This outline of the US and EU positions is revealing of an underlying difference in the 
transatlantic approach on Russia. Especially during Putin’s second term in office, Russia has 
become more confident and assertive both at home and abroad. To summarise what Russia 
stands for nowadays, the Kremlin has coined the term ‘sovereign democracy’. This succinctly 
summarises the path of a country that is willing to carry out economic and political reforms but 
that will do it on its own conditions, pace and more importantly, safeguarding its national 
interests.  
The notion of ‘sovereign democracy’ cuts neatly across the transatlantic divide on Russia. 
Moscow’s posture in the international area is that of a power with regional ambitions that aims 
to be treated as an equal, strategic counterpart to the EU and to the US. Although Washington’s 
views do not always coincide with Russia’s, there is an implicit compatibility between this 
posture and America’s ‘Westphalian’ mindset that was observed above.  
On the other hand, the overarching ‘neo-medieval’ idea of shared sovereignty and gradual 
integration that animates the EU’s neighbourhood approach appears unlikely to be absorbed in 
today’s Russia. The current difficulties of the two sides to agree on a new bilateral agreement 
replacing the outdated Partnership and Cooperation Agreement provide compelling evidence in 
this respect (Emerson et al., 2006).  
2.5  The Middle East and North Africa  
In the Southern neighbourhood, the general argument has been that the US and EU approaches 
are divergent. A plethora of contingent and structural circumstances justifies this claim, from 
the Iraq war to the continuing disagreement over the Middle East Peace Process. A schematic 
sketch of the policies of the two parties, however, reveals that the transatlantic approach to the 
Middle East and North Africa is not as polarised as is often depicted.  
The mainstream perception, especially in some ‘old’ European quarters, has been that the 
strategic and national security considerations have prevented Washington from approaching this 
region in an even-handed way. The US policy towards the countries of this region is regarded as 
assertive, short-term oriented and driven by an ‘ideological’ agenda. Washington’s priorities are 
seen as unduly influenced by its bias in favour of Israel,
6 its lack of respect for existing 
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multilateral fora (most notably the UN), and its thirst for hydrocarbons. Critics further point that 
such approach has resulted in strong, and often questionable, ties with countries such as Egypt 
and Jordan, while the US has ostracised – through diplomatic isolation, unilateral sanctions or 
pressures for ‘regime change’ – other countries such as Iran, Syria or, until recently, Libya.  
While evidence to support these claims abounds, this portrayal of US policies is somewhat 
distorted. For one, as we will see more thoroughly in the next section, US policies for promoting 
political and economic reforms in this region have been reasonably gradual and arguably more 
effective than those of its European counterparts (see Youngs, 2004). Secondly, Washington has 
not discarded regional engagement in this area, as the cases of the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative, the G-8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), or even the 
NATO Mediterranean Dialogue demonstrate. Lastly, while America’s multilateral commitment 
has been unquestionably tattered by the Iraq war and its aftermath, Washington has to a certain 
extent returned to engage in multilateral contexts, and with its European partners in particular. 
The negotiations conducted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and endorsed by the 
US, on Iran’s nuclear ambitions are a primary example of this trend. So was Libya’s 2003 
decision to give up its WMD programme. Multilateral diplomacy has inevitably been more 
problematic in the Middle East, as the paralysis of the so-called ‘Quartet’ (Russia, the UN, the 
EU, and the US) and its impalpable ‘Roadmap’ suggests. Yet, one can still point at, for 
example, American and French coordinated action that, in 2005, pressured Syria to withdraw its 
troops from Lebanon, or at the American and European efforts in the summer of 2006 to reach a 
ceasefire between the Hezbollah militias and Israel.  
The EU’s approach to the greater Mediterranean region has also developed some distinctive 
features. The EU’s contribution has been pivotal in fostering a holistic approach to the 
challenges emerging from the Mediterranean. This has most notably materialised in the 
establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) framework since 1995. In the EMP, 
regional cooperation proceeds along three ‘baskets’: the political and security basket; the 
economic basket; and the social, cultural and humanitarian affairs basket. Moreover, the EU has 
engaged with the countries of this large regional framework (spanning from Morocco to Jordan) 
at the bilateral level, through legally-binding Association Agreements and, more recently, 
through the detailed Action Plans of the ENP.  
The merit of this approach, particularly in the social sphere, has undoubtedly been to foster an 
inclusive discourse that embraces the historical and civilisational heritage of the countries 
surrounding the Mediterranean basin. Apart from that, however, the EMP has underperformed. 
For one, the EU has failed to engage the Southern Mediterranean countries in the regional 
process. Notwithstanding the inclusive rhetoric of European policy-makers, it was indeed self-
evident from the outset that the EMP prioritised issues such as immigration and economic 
cooperation rather than political and security affairs. Emblematic, in this respect, are the 
exclusion of the Middle East Peace Process from the first basket of the EMP and the failure of 
the partner countries to agree on a ‘Charter for Peace and Security’.  
Second, the EU has not been successful at engaging the grassroots level in North Africa and the 
Middle East. This is partly due to the excessive bureaucracy that characterises EU’s funding 
opportunities. Moreover, the EU has relied excessively on the regimes in the region to 
implement political and economic reforms. Quite remarkably, for example, EU assistance to 
civil society provided through the MEDA instrument and Anna Lindh Foundation is carried out 
mainly in coordination with the local, and often undemocratic, governments (Youngs, 2006). If 
the goal is to promote human rights, democratisation and societal modernisation, this seems a 
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Third, the EU’s approach on the Mediterranean has proved to be fragmented and muffled 
because of the different interests and cleavages of EU member states in the region. For one, 
there is the colonial heritage that ties, and clouds, the positions of several, influential European 
countries. No less important in shaping the position of European countries are factors such as 
their dependency on energy supplies and demographic pressures coming from the South. Last, 
veiled protectionism and contrasting economic interests of certain EU member states have made 
the EMP’s ambitious goal to turn the Mediterranean into a free trade area by the year 2010 
utterly out of reach.  
From a neighbourhood perspective, this brief outline of the US and EU’s approaches to 
Europe’s Southern periphery reveals a tacit acceptance of the Westphalian model on both sides. 
While policies on the ground may reveal a more cautious and gradual approach, it cannot be 
denied that strategic considerations have affected and, in a number of cases, driven America’s 
policies in the region. In this wider European context, however, argument can be made that 
Washington’s ‘Westphalian’ take on the region is also accentuated by an objective difficulty in 
qualifying the EU’s contribution to the reform processes in the wider Mediterranean area.  
As far as the EU is concerned, indeed, policy guidelines for this region continue to declaim the 
open, inclusive rhetoric of the ‘mare nostrum’, while the reality on the ground has revealed the 
inapplicability of such a model. The implementation of the ENP, in this respect, is a case in 
point. North African and Middle Eastern countries were included in the policy thanks to the 
pressures of Southern EU member states and of the then EU Commission President Romano 
Prodi. The way in which the ENP has progressed over the past biennium, however, reveals a 
widening gap between the Eastern and the Southern flanks of Europe’s periphery. In the former 
case, despite the disappointment of some of the countries concerned, a gradated, concentric-
circled model is slowly taking shape. In the Mediterranean, one can point at some cases where 
partial, gradated integration is possible – e.g. Morocco or Jordan. Yet, the picture emerging 
from the region as a whole reveals an ever-more visible dividing line between Europe and non-
Europe.  
3.  Bridging the Neighbourhood Gap  
Nobody in Brussels or Washington would object to a country like Ukraine developing into a 
transparent and prosperous market-based economy or that North African countries are 
transforming themselves into stable and mature democracies. The irritating paradox, in this 
transatlantic perspective, is that such taken-for-granted understanding on the essential goals to 
be pursued and the values to be promoted has made the two parties initially complacent and 
then prickly over each other’s approaches. In this sense, bridging the neighbourhood gap 
between the United States and Europe means refocusing thoroughly and frankly on what the 
two sides, in principle, already agree.  
I shall distinguish here three broad and deeply interrelated arguments – each encompassing a 
number of recommendations – that should inspire a more focused transatlantic agenda.       
3.1  The normative argument: Unravelling the democracy conundrum  
This is arguably the most obvious and at the same time the most contentious question facing the 
transatlantic alliance in the European neighbourhood.  
Virtually all the countries in the wider Europe are not mature, functioning liberal democracies. 
According to Freedom House, none of them – with the exception of Israel – can be categorised 
as ‘free’. Some of them, in North Africa, the Middle East as in the former Soviet republics, may 
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of such claim, the guiding principles of liberal constitutionalism – division of powers, the rule 
of law, independence of the judiciary, etc. – are generally still not complied with. Moreover, in 
a majority of these countries, there is no mature, established middle class, which has historically 
been a building block for the consolidation of liberal democratic institutions (see e.g. Zakaria, 
2003). 
In principle, this state of affairs should provide the most solid and committed basis for 
transatlantic cooperation. Both the EU and the US regard democracy as the deepest foundation 
of their polities and, in principle, make it a top priority of their policy outlooks in this region. 
However, both parties have calcified distorted perceptions on each other’s work in this field. 
The US is portrayed as an actor postured on the offensive, guided by an ideological agenda, and 
naïvely aiming to ‘export’ democracy. The open civil war now ravaging Iraq is of course there 
to remind some Europeans about how correct their assessment was back in 2003.  
The EU, for its part, is perceived on the other side of the Atlantic as a hopelessly muffled 
democratiser, affected by a sort of chronic ‘Algerian syndrome’, named after the unwelcome 
outcome of a democratic process which eventually led to civil war in that country. It prefers to 
focus on low-key, technical assistance – tellingly labelled ‘good governance’ – and does not 
address comprehensively the root causes of the democratic deficit in the region. An example 
that Americans can point at is provided by the way in which Europeans watered down the US 
Greater Middle East Initiative, which in 2004 became the BMENA. The resulting G8-sponsored 
enterprise lists ambitious goals but is endowed with less-focused and less-coordinated tools than 
the US had initially proposed. 
The reality on the ground, however, is not as polarised. In fact, American and European 
initiatives to support democracy in the European neighbourhoods have some remarkable 
similarities in both their assets and liabilities. The US governmental and quasi-governmental 
agencies in charge of democracy promotion, like USAID and the National Endowment for 
Democracy, have a gradual, deep and long-term-oriented approach (see Raik, 2006, p. 24). As 
Richard Youngs put it: “take Iraq out of the equation […] and it would be more convincing to 
fault US strategy for its extreme caution than its undue heavy-handedness” (Youngs, 2004, p. 
11). Likewise, Europeans are particularly effective, comprehensive and proactive when it comes 
to work done at the national level by some EU member states, through government agencies 
(e.g. the Swedish Sida or the Danish Danida) and foundations (especially the German 
Stiftungen). Admittedly, the EU level is still looking for a convincing way to replicate the 
successes of its enlargement strategy in the broader neighbourhood, a question we address more 
thoroughly in the next section. But it has demonstrated a willingness to step up its democracy 
support efforts, for example through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
and the recently proposed Governance Facility under the heading of the ENP. 
More worryingly, the US and European strategies are afflicted by similar shortages. This is 
primarily because, for both the EU and the US, the democracy question remains sandwiched in 
the false dilemma that opposes stability and chaos. Security-based and strategic considerations 
continue to be prioritised in a number of important cases in the neighbourhood and greatly 
damage the credibility and legitimacy of both sides. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most 
blatant example, but so is Bosnia-Herzegovina – where the international community’s support 
for the High Representative’s gubernatorial powers has so far hindered the emergence of a truly 
owned democratic process. Plus, of course, there is the case of Russia, where both Americans 
and Europeans largely continue to appease Vladimir Putin’s semi-authoritarian rule out of 
strategic and economic considerations.
7 It is also notable that when strategic considerations are 
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prioritised, the US and the EU may more easily disagree, which can be exploited by the 
countries in the region to play the two sides against each other.       
Where to go from here? At least two facets of this story can be distinguished. The first is 
‘external’ and concerns the coordination between the two sides. Since the Iraq war, Europeans 
have come to develop a sort of ‘Pavlovian’ negative reaction to US democracy promotion 
policies. The widespread tendency is to instinctively distance oneself from what Washington 
proposes. In view of what the US actually does on the ground, this attitude is counterproductive, 
especially if it is not followed by sensible, constructive proposals. Likewise, the general 
European argument that security and the resolution of conflicts precede political reforms has too 
often been a fig leaf with which to cover inaction over sensitive issues. The US, for its part, 
should appreciate that the EU’s multi-layered and diversified governance system can represent 
an important asset when promoting political reforms in the neighbourhood. Also, the fact that 
the EU as an actor can be less divisive than the US could encourage Washington to step back 
and let Brussels take the lead in certain parts of the Southern neighbourhood.
8 Lastly, issues 
such as debt relief and trade liberalisation do not directly involve political reforms but are 
closely tied to them and have often proven to be intractable.  
In other words, improving transatlantic coordination does not require that Brussels and 
Washington hold identical views on the strategic challenges of the region. But it does require a 
genuine political willingness to share the burden of implementation and to complement each 
other’s assets and liabilities.  
The second facet of this story is ‘internal’. In order to be effective, democracy support 
initiatives need to be sustainable. And consolidation relies heavily on the extent to which the 
local communities ‘own’ the democratisation process. It is therefore crucial that both sides seek 
to reach out to the deeper strata of society, civil society in particular (see Asmus et al., 2004). In 
this respect, one shortcoming, especially on the EU side, is that democracy assistance 
mechanisms are a jungle of red tape impenetrable to some democracy activists. The result is that 
the assistance tends be awarded to the same organisations and to become an aseptically 
technical and apolitical exercise. What is worse, there is a risk that democracy assistance will 
backfire altogether if projects, initiatives and organisations eligible to receive funding have to be 
selected together with the local, often undemocratic, governments. This practice, regrettably, 
will be perpetuated in the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. In this 
respect, the European Parliament’s proposal for a ‘European Foundation for Democracy through 
Partnership’ as well as the more ambitious idea of a Euro-Atlantic Foundation (Asmus et al., 
2004, p. 11) are worthy of note.  
The concrete incentives that the neighbours can expect in return for political reforms represent 
the logical trait d’union between these external and internal facets. Arguably, strict conditions 
need not be attached to civil society and democracy aid (see Raik, 2006, p. 15). The very fact 
that a country is undemocratic provides the rationale for supporting actors and initiatives that 
are willing to produce democratic changes. Still, it is also fair that well-performing countries are 
rewarded and encouraged to enact further reforms. This calls for a reflection on how 
conditionality should be framed in a transatlantic context, which is what we address next.  
3.2  The methodological argument: Calling conditionality by its name  
When it comes to the wider European neighbourhood, both the US and the EU appear to have 
been gradually weakening conditionality of its core meaning.  
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The EU carries a good part of the responsibility for this state of affairs, if only because it made 
conditionality the crucial mechanism behind its enlargement process. In the case of Central 
Europe, conditionality worked because benefits coming from the EU membership perspective 
were regarded by the candidate countries as greater than the costly, overarching reforms 
imposed by Brussels. This basic mechanism does not seem to apply in the same way for the 
countries under scrutiny here.  
Countries in the Western Balkans and Turkey now perceive the distinct possibility that their 
membership perspective will at some point be severely limited (through the above-mentioned 
‘safeguard’ clauses) or even turned down (for instance, as the result of a popular referendum in 
an EU country). This state of affairs generates uncertainty and undermines the credibility of the 
EU’s offer. Governments in the candidate countries perceive the costs of compliance as too high 
or less defensible vis-à-vis their domestic constituencies. Their reformist impetus slows down 
or, in the worst case, reverses. 
The ‘positive conditionality’ of the ENP is also intrinsically deficient, due to its lack of 
concrete, appealing incentives that will justify painful political and economic reforms in the 
neighbouring countries. The EU Commission shifted from offering neighbours the opportunity 
to participate in the EU’s ‘four freedoms’ to proposing a more blurred ‘stake’ in its internal 
market. In both cases, the common denominator is the categorical refusal to include any explicit 
‘European perspective’ in the package. Admittedly, uncertainty was also a crucial feature of the 
enlargement process towards Central and Eastern Europe. In the enlargement case, uncertainty 
was intrinsic to a process that was painstakingly monitored and benchmarked. In that case, 
however, the EU did not waver about membership as the final outcome of the process. In the 
ENP, uncertainty surrounds the very incentives that neighbours should aim for, i.e. the key 
element that should trigger compliance. The forthcoming ENP Governance Fund, as well as the 
explicit offer of ‘deep’ free trade areas for all the ENP countries (see European Commission, 
2006) are welcome additions to correct the course of the policy. 
As for Russia, the EU appears unable to circumvent Moscow’s refusal to deal with the EU on 
the basis of the acquis communautaire and of its standards. In fairness, Russia is not an EU 
candidate country and has no obligations in that respect. However, given the deterioration of the 
rule of law and of the democratic institutions in Russia, the fact that Brussels and Moscow 
should define a different, ad hoc negotiating basis constitutes a subtle blow to the ability of the 
EU to act in foreign policy.  
The US, for its part, has had a controversial take on conditionality and on EU conditionality in 
particular. Its bilateral relations with countries lying in the European neighbourhood are too 
diverse to define a pattern. The correlation between economic incentives and pressure for 
political reforms has been weak and disputable in its relations with such countries as Egypt or 
Russia. On the other hand, The US has resorted quite frequently to the practice of what one 
might broadly define as ‘negative conditionality’ – ranging from freezing of bilateral relations 
to sanctions and the threat of military action – if one looks at America’s position vis-à-vis Iran, 
Belarus or Syria.  
On this basis, one could be tempted to conclude that the US approach is too politically-driven to 
provide a coherent pattern on its use of conditionality. In our neighbourhood perspective, 
however, this assessment also reveals that where the EU policy and overall strategy is 
sufficiently credible – e.g. Turkey, the Balkans and prospectively even Ukraine – the American 
position has proven to be generally supportive of EU conditionality-based mechanisms. 
Conversely, the cases where the US approach to conditionality is most controversial coincide 
with those where EU conditionality has been less effective, e.g. North Africa, the Middle East 
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If positive or negative conditionality are to trigger real domestic change in the countries 
concerned, the current state of affairs calls for a more thorough reconsideration of the issue on 
both sides and in a transatlantic perspective.  
The EU needs to be more explicit about what the ‘stake in the internal market’ promised in the 
ENP will eventually amount to: arrangements like the European Economic Area,
9 ‘partial’ EU 
membership or possibly something else. Likewise, the EU should generally get more serious 
about negative conditionality. The ENP Action Plans are not legally-binding agreements and the 
possibility to exert some meaningful pressure on non-compliant countries will rely on what 
legally ties the EU with the individual country. It is well known, for example, that the 
Association Agreements with the Mediterranean partners contain a suspension clause, which 
has never been seriously considered.
10  
The US needs to undertake a serious reassessment of its conditionality-based policies, 
particularly in North Africa and the Middle East where, in the words of an analyst: “there is as 
yet no clear answer to the question of how to make conditionality effective, [or] how to prevent 
conditionality on political reforms from exacting costs in terms of Arab cooperation with 
strategic American goals in the region, especially in the peace process and the war on terrorism” 
(Cofman Wittes, 2004, p. 80).  
In a transatlantic perspective, the EU and the US should engage in a much more frank dialogue 
about the whole spectrum of possible incentives and penalisations facing the individual 
countries. When the approaches converge, or in order to encourage convergence, it would be 
logical if the two parties could systematise the transatlantic dialogue in country/region-level 
formats of discussion modelled on the Contact Group on the Balkans.
11 This could enormously 
facilitate the exchange of information, lessons learned and best practices about implementation 
of the work.  
Along the same lines, it is also imperative that both the EU and the US seek the highest possible 
degree of convergence when they decide to go for ‘negative conditionality’. This is not only 
because sanctions are less effective if one party goes for them and the other does not.
12 It is also 
because sanctions tend to be ineffective if the penalties are not followed by a genuine, concerted 
attempt to enter into dialogue and negotiate directly with the sanctioned country. This was one 
of the lessons coming from Libya’s abandonment of its WMD programme (see, for example, 
Jentleson & Whytock, 2006). In the European neighbourhood, it is applicable to cases such as 
Belarus and Iran.    
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specific sectoral policies such as trade, agriculture and fisheries), but they do not have the possibility to 
influence EU decision-making bodies on the issues concerned.  
10 Notably, in November 2006, the EU Finnish presidency ”recalled [the] existence” of such clause in 
relation to Azerbaijan (see Beatty, 2007).  
11 See, for a similar argument applied to the case of the greater Middle East, Daalder et al. (2006, pp. 240-
241). 
12 I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  t h e  s t o r y  o f  E u r o p e a n  a n d  U S  relations with Iran over the past three decades is 
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3.3  The geopolitical argument: Decoupling and recoupling Euro-Atlantic 
integration  
The EU and NATO enlargement processes towards Central and Eastern Europe were 
complementary and mutually reinforcing in guiding Europe’s transformation and reunification. 
One could probably foresee a looming divergence between the EU and the US with respect to 
the implications of the double enlargement for the power constellation in Europe. Yet, the two 
sides, and the candidate countries, regarded these processes as part and parcel of the overall 
continental transition towards democracy, security and prosperity.  
The Western Balkans today represent the missing piece of this puzzle. Left out in the early 
1990s by fratricidal hatred and the reservations of the West, their integration in both the EU and 
NATO represents now a natural completion of the grand project that started in Central Europe. 
This background, for one, may be a plausible explanation for the rather smooth NATO-EU 
cooperation in the region. More importantly, in the face of the growing difficulties concerning 
sovereignty, rule of law and statehood that the EU is facing in the region, this background may 
allow the parties to adjust the NATO-first path tested in Central Europe to the specific 
circumstances and cleavages of this region. The decisions of the Riga Summit provide fresh 
evidence in this respect.  
At the same time, a frank reassessment of the Euro-Atlantic partnership implies that the EU and 
the US acknowledge that the process of parallel enlargement and integration is not going to be 
replicated in countries of the European neighbourhood. More than that, the two sides have to 
acknowledge that the implications of this shift are noteworthy.  
NATO may be transforming into an alliance with global aspirations that can in principle 
encompass countries well beyond Europe. The EU will inevitably follow a different path as the 
vast majority of its neighbours are not eligible for EU membership. In the other cases, vide 
Ukraine and Georgia, the prospect of NATO membership raises controversial domestic 
questions, which make the NATO-first strategy inapplicable.  
Moreover, the last enlargement round has complicated the bilateral relations between the two 
bodies. As the saying goes, the EU and NATO continue to be based in the same city but live on 
different planets. What formally obstructs closer relations is indeed an offspring of the 2004 
enlargement: the Cyprus-Turkey dispute. Cyprus is not a NATO member or a participant in the 
Partnership for Peace framework, and Turkey has blocked its participation in joint EU-NATO 
meetings. Some EU member states uphold the principle that decisions within the Union should 
be taken unanimously and, as a result, the scope of EU-NATO dialogue narrows down to 
discussing only each other’s military capabilities and what the two sides are already doing 
together (see Keohane, 2006). 
These differences – together with the broader, fundamental question of the compatibility 
between NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy – are of a structural and 
institutional nature and can hardly serve as a prelude to a more convergent strategic outlook vis-
à-vis the European neighbourhood in the short term. What both the US and the EU should push 
for is a more flexible and, if necessary, informal coordination between the two institutions.  
This would imply, for one, furthering the cooperative experiences that NATO and the EU have 
had in recent times in the Balkans. Foreign ministers and member states’ representatives at the 
EU and NATO should continue to meet informally and discuss issues that exceed the scope of 
the narrow official agenda. EU and NATO high officials could also step up exchange of 
information on analysis and policy planning (Keohane, 2006.).  
Another way to re-couple the Euro-Atlantic integration strategy more effectively is to diversify 
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willing to push for closer regional cooperation: from the Black Sea (BSEC, GUAM), to the Gulf 
(Gulf Cooperation Council) and the Mediterranean (the Arab Maghreb Union and the Agadir 
Agreement).  
In the absence of a membership perspective, regional cooperation in the European 
neighbourhood provides a useful format to address political, economic and societal challenges 
that concern both the EU and the US (see Tassinari, 2005). Yet, without the commitment and 
political will of the countries concerned, these initiatives have usually underperformed. This is a 
valid explanation for the partial failure of the EU’s Barcelona Process and for the decision of the 
international community to gradually ‘transfer’ the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to 
the Balkan countries themselves. Conversely, one interesting experience from the previous 
enlargement round was the parallel launching of the EU’s Northern Dimension and of the US’s 
Northern European Initiative. Both initiatives are regional, inclusive and have developed in 
accord with the countries concerned (the Baltics, Poland, Russia and the Nordic states). These 
features have ensured their sustainability, so much so that both policies have not been 
discontinued after enlargement.
13   
Lastly, transatlantic cooperation should sharpen its focus on specific themes and policy sectors. 
This applies to the fields of environmental protection, transport and especially the security of 
energy supplies. The latter, in particular, represents a key interest in the greater European 
neighbourhood for both the EU and the US. The EU, for its part, still lags behind in 
implementing its fledgling common energy strategy. Still, when it comes to the contentious 
issue of diversification, especially of Russia’s resources, observers and policy-makers on both 
sides of the Atlantic agree on the pivotal role that for example Turkey is bound to play for 
transit (Roberts, 2004), and that NATO could play for the security of supplies.
14  
At a more general, global level, one cannot escape the fact that several countries in the greater 
European neighbourhood – namely, Russia, the Gulf monarchies, Iran and the Central Asian 
republics – constitute the bulk of the world’s oil (and, possibly, gas
15) ‘cartel’. As Fareed 
Zakaria (Zakaria, 2006/2007), among others, has argued, such countries have so far managed to 
avoid modernisation and democratisation thanks to the combination of high oil prices and stable 
levels of demand from the West.  
Both for the purpose of ensuring their energy supplies and for furthering their broader strategic 
goals in the region, the EU and the US share an interest in having market-based prices rather 
than “cartels or speculative manipulations. Is it too far-fetched” continues Zakaria “to imagine 
informal cooperation among key consuming nations?” (Zakaria, 2006/2007). For the EU and the 
US it would be definitely worth trying to explore this avenue too. Surely, more ‘formal’ 
instruments exist, such as the Energy Charter Treaty and its Transit Protocol. The EU and the 
US would be well advised to keep the diplomatic pressure on, particularly vis-à-vis Russia, for a 
ratification of this document.  
                                                      
13 The ‘new’ Northern Dimension has been recently repackaged as a multilateral framework including the 
EU, Russia, Iceland and Norway. And meanwhile, the Bush administration has launched the Enhanced 
Partnership in Northern Europe (e-Pine) as a substitute for the Northern European Initiative.  
14 US Senator Richard Lugar was one of those who advocated NATO Charter’s Article 5 protection in 
case of a cut-off of energy supplies to an allied country (see Socor, 2006).  
15 On the possibility of a gas cartel see Socor (2007) and for a critique see Darbouche (2007). It should be 
noted here that the dependency of the US on gas imports is admittedly much less pronounced that the 
EU’s. The US produces about 80% of the gas it comsumes and imports the rest primarily from Mexico 
and Canada. Still, US stakeholders have been very active in relation to the pipelines geopolitics in Central 
Asia and in the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) technology.  A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD | 21 
 
4. Conclusions   
Are the EU and the US committed to make the European neighbourhood ‘whole and free’ by 
means of the successful Euro-Atlantic integration strategy of the 1990s? Given the broad array 
of countries and challenges in this region, the picture emerging from this analysis is inevitably 
mixed.  
This paper argued that, in a transatlantic perspective, this neighbourhood puzzle is deeply 
embedded in different conceptual outlooks of the two sides towards the wider European security 
and integration. The American posture was here labelled as ‘Westphalian’. The US largely 
continues to support continuing EU expansion but it underestimates the actorness and the 
geopolitical clout that the EU can (potentially) muster in its backyard. The EU’s neo-medieval 
model, on the other hand, has grown introspective and uncertain, as the somewhat disappointing 
policy-outputs of the recent years – from the ENP to the EU-Russian partnership – seem to 
confirm.  
The schematised picture of transatlantic convergence and divergence in the European 
neighbours provided evidence to justify this state of affairs. Here we have countries, namely the 
Western Balkans, for which the post-cold war Euro-Atlantic integration strategy still applies. 
This partly relates to Turkey as well, although the EU and the US appear to increasingly diverge 
about the place that Turkey should occupy in the EU and, more importantly about the extent to 
which Ankara’s membership will change the EU itself. The EU and the US have demonstrated a 
remarkable degree of convergence in Western CIS countries – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and 
the Southern Caucasian republics. On the other hand, they are drifting apart as to these 
countries’ final place in the Euro-Atlantic institutional family. Concerning Russia, the EU and 
the US are both uncertain as to their position on the interest-values spectrum. At the same time, 
we argued that Russia holds an inherently Westphalian vision on the future of the wider Europe, 
which partly explains Moscow’s increasing disagreements with the EU as well as its implicit 
convergence with Washington’s worldview. Last, there is the Middle East and North Africa. 
Here the EU-US dialogue is still polluted by historical cleavages and diverging strategic 
considerations. Yet, the assets and liabilities of the respective policies on the ground present 
potential for complementarity.    
On the basis of this assessment and its conceptual justification, this paper suggested a set of 
recommendations at the normative, methodological and geopolitical levels that could inspire a 
more consistent transatlantic agenda that accounts for the emergence of a European 
neighbourhood. These can be distilled in seven main points:   
1.  Democracy promotion strategies. Notwithstanding diverging strategic considerations 
and over-politicised misperceptions of each other, there is ample space for 
complementarity in the democratisation policies that the US and the EU carry out on the 
ground. Policy-makers on both sides have much to gain from reinforcing each other’s 
credentials in the region and should be more explicit and unambiguous in moving their 
respective discourses towards the centre of the political spectrum.  
2.  Civil society empowerment. Excessive bureaucracy, lack of coordination, under-funding 
or political biases have made it often difficult for the US and Europe to reach out to the 
deeper strata of society, and particularly civil society. The creation of new non- or 
quasi-governmental bodies – e.g. foundations – at the EU or even at the transatlantic 
level could be advantageous to further this paramount goal.  
3.  Comprehensive benchmarking. The US and the EU should be more rigorous and 
transparent about the conditions and the incentives that are attached to their political 
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country- or region-level formats for transatlantic dialogue and exchange of information, 
along the lines of the Contact Group on the Western Balkans.  
4.  Negative conditionality. When it comes to freezing bilateral relations or imposing 
sanctions on a given country, it is imperative that the EU and the US seek the highest 
degree of convergence. The two parties should also lay down a joint, basic approach to 
negotiate directly with the penalised country.  
5.  NATO-EU relations. The parallel, double enlargement of the EU and NATO in Central 
Europe is not going to be replicated in the European neighbourhood and will further 
decouple the overall strategy of Euro-Atlantic integration. In order to circumvent the 
structural hurdles that currently prevent closer EU-NATO cooperation, they should also 
push for ad hoc, if needed informal, initiatives to improve dialogue between the two 
Brussels bodies.   
6.  Regional cooperation. In the absence of a membership perspective in either NATO or 
EU, Euro-Atlantic integration can be pursued by encouraging the formation of regional 
constellations in the European neighbourhood. In the Eastern periphery, as in the Black 
Sea, the Gulf or the Mediterranean, both the US and the EU should encourage the 
creation, enhancement and streamlining of regional cooperation mechanisms ‘owned’ 
by the neighbouring countries themselves.  
7.  Energy security. Washington and Brussels should account for the impact that the 
‘securitisation’ of energy supplies is having on their broader political goals in the 
European neighbourhood. In order to defuse the energy question, they could intensify 
their work on diversification of supplies; explore the possibility of informal cooperation 
among key consuming countries; and heighten the diplomatic pressure to activate 
existing multilateral legal instruments.   
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